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Abstract: Social media have created communication channels between citizens and policymakers 
but are also susceptible to rampant misinformation. This new context demands new social media 
policies that can aid policymakers in making evidence-based decisions for combating 
misinformation online. This paper reports on data collected from policymakers in Austria, Greece, 
and Sweden, using focus groups and in-depth interviews. Analyses provide insights into challenges 
and identify four important themes for supporting policy-making for combating misinformation: a) 
creating a trusted network of experts and collaborators, b) facilitating the validation of online 
information, c) providing access to visualisations of data at different levels of granularity, and d) 
increasing the transparency and explainability of flagged misinformative content. These 
recommendations have implications for rethinking how revised social media policies can contribute 
to evidence-based decision-making. 
Issue 4 
 
This paper is part of Trust in the system, a special issue of Internet Policy Review guest-
edited by Péter Mezei and Andreea Verteş-Olteanu. 
1. Introduction 
Policymakers around the world are tasked with the responsibility of developing 
roadmaps to support democratic societies’ decision-making processes but are also 
expected to guide reactions to high-risk situations in a rational, evidence-based 
approach. Social media are undisputable channels of communication, as evidenced 
by the huge numbers of everyday users, and their patterns of use (Perrin & Kumar, 
2019; European Commission, 2018). In periods of heated public discussions, such 
as during major social crises, social media can be mined to understand trends, 
finetune policies, monitor the spread of misinformation, and guide actions at the 
collective level. Yet, in an era when opinions are formed and transformed online, 
policymakers seem to primarily use media to merely inform citizens, despite rec-
ommendations that they should be using social media to understand, connect and 
engage with citizens (Kapp, Hensel, & Schnoring, 2015). Avery (2017) surveyed 226 
public information officers (PIOs) in the United States to understand how they use 
social media during public health crises; results indicate low monitoring of social 
media and point out that increased social media monitoring led to increased satis-
faction with how these PIOs handled the crisis. 
An important area of policy-making is the development of strategies to address 
the spread of misinformation surrounding important societal issues in several di-
verse contexts, such as politics, health, the environment, commerce, etc. However, 
the term misinformation has not been defined in a consistent manner in the litera-
ture (Vraga & Bode, 2020). Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) distinguish between 
three types of misrepresentation of information: mis-information, dis-information, 
and mal-information, which they define as follows: 
• Mis-information is when false information is shared, but no harm is meant. 
• Dis-information is when false information is knowingly shared to cause 
harm. 
• Mal-information is when genuine information is shared to cause harm, 
often by moving information designed to stay private into the public 
sphere. 
(Wardle & Derakshan, 2017, p. 5) 
Wardle and Derakshan’s definition of the misrepresentation of misinformation, and 
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its distinction from other types of what they call information disorders, focuses on 
the purpose of spreading false information and the intent to harm (or lack thereof). 
A similar definition has been shared in formal reports of the European Commission 
(High Level Group on fake news and online disinformation, 2018). Vraga and Bode 
(2020) discussed the contextualised and bounded nature of misinformation and of-
fered a nuanced description of how to identify accurate or inaccurate information 
and address the changing context of misinformation, based on two main criteria: 
expert consensus and best evidence to-date. Vraga and Bode (2020), who also out-
line the challenges in characterising information as misinforming, explain that 
whether some information can be termed misinformation is dependent on the state 
of evidence, expert beliefs and the information environment in which misinforma-
tion occurs; thus, depending on the context the same information may be cate-
gorised in different ways. 
Crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic further expose the problem of misinforma-
tion on social media. People around the world increasingly turned to the internet 
to actively seek information on pressing matters; at the same time, internet plat-
forms, such as Facebook and YouTube, struggled to address the heightened de-
mand for reliable information, as human moderation availability declined due to 
COVID-19 safety issues (Magalhães & Katzenbach, 2020). A recent review of the 
quality of online information on COVID-19 for lay people confirms prior reports on 
the abundance of low-quality, low-readability and low-reliability materials online, 
which can lead to the spread of misinformation, can increase panic among the 
general population, and may lead to non-rational actions (Cuan-Baltazar, Muñoz-
Perez, Robledo-Vega, Pérez-Zepeda, & Soto-Vega, 2020). Public health is not, how-
ever, the only case where misinformation can spread with potentially disastrous 
effects. The mostly unregulated spread of misinformation on social media, the lack 
of formal gatekeepers, and the potential to influence major political events, such 
as Brexit and the US 2016 and 2020 elections, indicate that policymakers should 
be cognisant of what is happening online and should be ready to mine social me-
dia so that they can be in direct communication with the real world and reach in-
formed decisions on how to address potentially problematic areas. At the same 
time, policymakers should be careful in the recommendations they make, so that 
the trust of the public in the information shared online, or in the institutions them-
selves, is not undermined, as happened in the case of the Chinese government 
censorship of early COVID-19 warnings by a young doctor. According to Larson 
(2020) policymakers should be careful in how to respond to misinformation, and 
especially the sanctions they may decide to impose, in order to maintain the peo-
ple’s trust, uphold democratic ideals, and avoid undue spread of misinformation 
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(such as mistakenly believing that drinking bleach will cure COVID-19) that might 
have potentially disastrous consequences. 
Despite the vast amount of misinformation on online media, there are currently no 
clear policies or recommendations for determining how to manage misinformation 
on social media platforms, how to deal with it when detected, what legal frame-
works and ethical issues to consider, how to disseminate corrective information, 
and how to encourage citizens to read or share corrective information as soon as it 
becomes available. Doing so is proving difficult, as social media platforms were 
not designed with policy-making in mind, having instead focused on promoting 
users’ personal interactions with each other. In addition, case studies such as the 
one published by Jabbar, La Londe, Debray, Scott, and Lubienski (2014), who inves-
tigated the use of evidence by policymakers in response to hurricane Katrina, con-
tribute evidence that policymakers’ access to evidence in New Orleans during the 
Katrina crisis was brokered by others and that the policymakers themselves used 
anecdotes or personal experiences to guide their decisions. Such reports suggest a 
need for tools to support first-person inquiring into primary evidence in order to 
understand the dynamic spread of information on social media and its potential 
consequences. 
Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) examined the spread of false information on Twitter 
from 2006 to 2017 and concluded that false information spread much faster than 
the corresponding true information and was diffused to more people, more deeply 
and more broadly. Furthermore, Vosoughi et al.’s analyses showed that people, 
more than bots, were the culprits in spreading such misinformation. Psychology 
and communication research report that simply presenting people with corrective 
information does not change their fundamental beliefs and opinions and may even 
reinforce them (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, 
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012); these researchers cite psychological mechanisms such as 
the continued influence effect and worldview backfire effect to explain the persis-
tence of misinformation despite the efforts to debunk it. In a meta-review of 32 
studies with more than 6,000 participants, Walter and Tukachinsky (2020) report 
that even though correcting misinformation might be effective if attention is paid 
to the design characteristics of the corrective information, it is not fully effective. 
Some strategies seem to hold potential in successfully addressing misinformation 
online and correcting misperceptions, such as providing timely corrections, provid-
ing coherent explanations rather than simple refutes, exposing related but discon-
firming stories, and revealing the demographic similarity of the opposing group 
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Walter & Tukachinsky, 2020). Now, more than ever, it 
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seems more evident that policy-making in the online world should be a shared en-
deavour, one that does not follow the conventional paths of policy-making and 
one that requires an understanding of the complex life cycle of the spread and 
regulation of misinformation online. 
The work presented in this paper investigates policy-making-related challenges 
about tackling misinformation within the rapidly changing online environment, 
and the implications for human policymakers and for developing internet platform 
policies. We define internet platform policies as practices and rules for managing 
misinformation on online platforms. This paper is not about targeting specific con-
tent areas of misinformation from the perspective of policy-making; rather it is re-
lated to what policymakers perceive as challenges and as areas for improving the 
policy-making process in relation to the propagation of information on social me-
dia. Therefore, this paper asks what policymakers in three national contexts identi-
fy as challenges to combating misinformation on social media, and what sugges-
tions they may have to support evidence-based policy-making and the creation of 
a misinformation-resilient environment. These issues are at the core of this empir-
ical paper. To the best of our knowledge, there is little published information that 
reports on what policymakers, themselves, indicate would be useful to them to ad-
dress online misinformation, thus also providing insights into the types of policies 
that could be implemented on social media platforms for this purpose. In addition, 
this work seeks to inform policy development and the socio-technical design of 
software to address misinformative content (automatically and/or with user inter-
vention) in the context of the European Horizon 2020 project Co-Inform 
(www.coinform.eu). 
2. Policymakers, platform policies, and misinformation 
on social media 
Policy-making is a broad construct that covers all areas of social activity, such as 
economy, health, education, foreign affairs, etc. Policymakers can be civil servants, 
and may sometimes be elected to serve this role. Misinformation on social media 
can have far-reaching consequences and, as such, is of interest to policymakers. At 
the same time, inviting citizen participation in policy-making can enhance policy-
makers’ understanding by offering diversity of ideas and new insights into complex 
problems from the stakeholders’ point of view (Fischer, 2003). This new view of 
participatory policy-making can lead to increased engagement from the public and 
better-informed decision-making that reflects the needs of the people. 
In this work we use the terms policymakers and policy-making to refer to human ac-
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tors involved in formulating policies related to issues of societal importance, and 
the term policies to refer to the outcome of such governance decisions, online or 
offline. Internet platform policies seeking to mitigate the spread of misinformation 
on online media can take a variety of forms, which differ in the extent to which in-
formation is regulated, who is performing the regulation, and the role of the user 
in this process. Policies can be instituted via traditional channels, such as national 
governments, but are also reported to be increasingly automated, defined by the 
industry and internet platforms such as Facebook or Google (Picard & Pickard, 
2017), with some researchers even discussing technology as a policymaker in its 
own right (Lessig, 1999; Just & Latzer, 2017). Braman (2016) explicitly identifies 
computer scientists and engineers as central policymakers on the internet, as their 
technical work, whether intended as such or not, creates the rules by which the in-
ternet works. 
Policies for combating misinformation can be transparent or opaque. For instance, 
it is now well known that automated algorithms often decide who sees what on 
social media. While one of the reasons for the automatic selection and delivery of 
personalised news to users was to address information overload, this phenomenon 
is now widely discussed as potentially diminishing transparency and democratic 
participation on the internet, and as a policy-implementing, governance mecha-
nism. Stray (2019) identified a taxonomy of six strategies that can contribute to 
combating disinformation, in particular, by examining and contrasting three cases: 
China as an example of an authoritarian government, Facebook as a global inter-
net platform, and EU East StratCom Task Force, as a counter-propaganda group. 
The six strategies are refutation, exposure of inauthenticity, alternative narratives, al-
gorithmic filter manipulation, speech laws, and censorship, all of which except cen-
sorship, as Stray argues, are legitimate approaches to countering disinformation. 
While in some countries with authoritarian regimes the internet is heavily regulat-
ed and even censored by the government, in Europe the EU’s Regulation on open 
Internet access (Regulation (EU) 2015/2120) and net neutrality, requests that there 
are open channels of distribution and access of information, without any discrimi-
nation. 
Recent collaborations between social media platforms and fact-checking organisa-
tions have led to a hybrid mode of regulation, in which human fact-checkers work 
with algorithmic outcomes to provide information to platforms, such as Facebook, 
on the veracity of news posts (Graves, 2018). Such efforts may lead to posts being 
removed from the social media platform. This work is also aligned with calls by 
the European Commission (High Level Group on fake news and online disinforma-
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tion, 2018) for increased efforts to empower users to address misinformation and 
disinformation on social media. However, as contemporary policy-making involves 
active use of social media to monitor and engage with online discussions on im-
portant societal issues, understanding how social media regulation efforts can be 
extended to address the needs and challenges that policymakers face online is 
particularly important. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Stakeholder input 
This work is part of the interdisciplinary project “Co-Creating Misinformation-Re-
silient Societies” (Co-Inform), funded by the European Commission to develop on-
line tools and policies that can support the civil society and professionals (policy-
makers and journalists) in mitigating the threat of misinformation on social media. 
Our work assumes that machine learning and human-aided approaches need to 
work side by side; it also aims to empower instead of censor the expression of 
ideas online. Our methods draw from stakeholder theory (Freeman, Harrison, 
Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010). To do so, ongoing work brings together three 
stakeholder groups (general citizens, journalists, policymakers from different 
fields) recruited in Austria, Greece, and Sweden, to co-create socio-technical solu-
tions to misinformation on social media. In this paper, we primarily focus on in-
sights from the policymakers’ stakeholder group, even though there are shared 
findings across groups which will be reported on elsewhere as our project pro-
gresses. 
We view the involvement of stakeholders as a form of collaborative policy-making, 
for which there are compelling arguments and many initiatives at local and global 
levels (Innes & Booher, 2003). Such efforts seek to move away from positivist 
views of policy-making, which yield top-down regulations by governments or other 
organisations. Similarly, stakeholder theory, which was originally developed as a 
new paradigm to address rapidly changing business challenges, has been applied 
to several other issues of societal importance where understanding and addressing 
the needs of the target audience is becoming increasingly important (Freeman, 
Harrison, Parmar, & de Colle, 2010). This governance model involves co-creation 
processes which integrate views of various stakeholders and not only of "educated 
experts". Frequently, outcomes of such decision-making processes include knowl-
edge on the ground as well as enjoy higher levels of legitimacy and trust (Renn, 
2008). 
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Innes and Booher (2003) argue that the complexity of current policy-making issues 
requires a multitude of contributions, due to a vast diversity of values, knowledge 
specialisation, needs, etc. By connecting to stakeholders, policymakers can more 
fluidly understand the dynamic landscape of interdependent interests, engage in 
constructive dialogue, and construct solutions that address real problems. Further-
more, stakeholder involvement in policy-making is aligned with the principle of af-
fected interests (Fung, 2010) which states that democratic participation should al-
low individuals to take part in decision-making that pertains to their own inter-
ests. 
3.2 Data collection 
For this study we collected the perspectives of citizens, journalists, and policymak-
ers as concrete case studies at three co-creation sites in Austria (Vienna), Greece 
(Athens) and Sweden (Stockholm). Data were collected through focus groups and 
in-depth, personal interviews, amassing over nine hours of video data for focus 
groups and over 13 hours of videotaped interviews. The collected data were com-
parable across sites, as the same detailed protocols were provided to each of the 
co-creation site’s workshop coordinators. Protocols focused on gathering data to 
gain insights into the contexts and situations that may lead to misinformation; the 
personal and professional practices in relation to credibility assessment of content 
found on social media; the types of evidence that are needed to convince a policy-
maker that a piece of information is trustworthy; the challenges faced when at-
tempting to address misinformation online, and proposed solutions to this prob-
lem. 
3.3 Participants 
Sixty-seven (67) representatives from three stakeholder groups (civil society, jour-
nalists, policymakers) participated in co-creation workshops at the three locations 
in an effort to understand practices, challenges and needs relating to misinforma-
tion-resilient behaviours on social media. While some activities included partici-
pants from all stakeholder groups, focus group discussions were conducted sepa-
rately for each stakeholder group. Twenty-one (21) policymakers (Austria: 7; 
Greece: 9; Sweden: 5) participated in the three policymakers’ focus groups, and 
eight policymakers (Austria: 2; Greece: 2; Sweden: 4) participated in in-depth inter-
views conducted after the conclusion of the workshops. Policymakers’ backgrounds 
were diverse and included public sector officials as well as NGO representatives. At 
each of the sites we invited policymakers and practitioners, people who were af-
fected by misinformation professionally and who felt committed to fight misinfor-
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mation in their area. For example, in Austria policymakers felt committed to ad-
dress the issues of misinformation which was relevant to the housing sector and 
migration. Their examples came from their own practice and choices were influ-
enced by experience in concrete policy relevant activities. All participants were 
voluntarily involved in the workshops, were provided with information about the 
project prior to the workshop, and provided their written informed consent for all 
parts of the data collection process. All steps were taken to ensure participants’ 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
3.4 Data analysis 
Data were transcribed verbatim and analysed using the qualitative analysis soft-
ware NVivo Pro 12, using detailed coding schemes. The coding schemes identified 
the situations that may lead to misinformation and the actions that the stakehold-
ers take as a result, and gathered information on how stakeholders viewed their 
own online practices relating to addressing misinformation, their perceived chal-
lenges and needs, and the type of evidence needed to trust the information. The 
analysis of the data adopted a grounded theory methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994) which, through the constant comparative method, seeks to develop theory 
using empirical evidence derived through a systematic analysis of the data. After 
initial discussions of the coding schemes and joint coding of parts of the data, in-
ter-rater reliability was assessed by two of the authors using a new subset of the 
data. There was high consistency between the two raters, with Cohen’s κ=0.863 
(95% CI, .737 to .988), p<.0005, which according to Landis and Koch (1977) is ex-
cellent. The two raters then independently coded the data set; these codes were 
also reviewed by two other senior members of the authors’ team, thus increasing 
the reliability of the reported findings. 
4. Findings 
The qualitative analyses of the data corpus amassed from the focus group and in-
depth individual interviews suggest continuity between the principles of tradition-
al policy-making and data gathering online, but also emphasise the need for 
changing the internet platforms’ landscape to adjust to the complexities of con-
temporary policy-making and the multivocality of engagement in democratic soci-
eties. Results suggest a need to introduce new platform policies and functionality, 
but also a need for renegotiating, re-prioritising, and re-inventing policy-making 
processes and key actors. Study participants called for action on two levels: imme-
diate action level and long-term action. In terms of the immediate action level, 
there is a recognition that agents of policy change (such as trusted policy networks 
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and knowledge brokers) are still a vital aspect of the tradition of policy-making 
(Smith & Katikireddi, 2013), but also seem to be side-stepped by the rapid propa-
gation of online information, as we will discuss next. Therefore, there is a need for 
reconceptualising practices that can support policy-making in the fast-paced, on-
line world. In fact, results suggest that policy-making may already happen through 
technology mediation and algorithmic manipulations; study participants raise this 
as both beneficial and as a problem, and ask that human involvement assumes an 
equally significant role in the online policy-making process. 
Stray’s (2017) strategies to counter disinformation are aligned with policymakers’ 
descriptions of actions they would like to take in response to misinforming posts 
on social media: they wish to refute, expose inauthentic comments, and provide al-
ternative narratives. However, before they are able to do so, policymakers recog-
nise that they, too, are uncertain of which information and whom or what they can 
trust, as verification measures traditionally in place are now collapsing or unable 
to support them in real-time: can they trust information they have in front of 
them? Who should help them interpret it? How can they transform their network 
to quickly fact-check and assess the reliability of the information in this new situa-
tion? 
In the sections that follow, we first provide an overview of the challenges that 
were identified by the policymakers who participated in this study, and then pre-
sent the four main themes which have implications for platform policies and con-
temporary view of policy-making in the context of combating misinformation: a) 
creating a trusted network of experts and collaborators, b) facilitating the valida-
tion of online information, c) providing access to visualisations of data at different 
levels of granularity, and d) increasing the transparency and explainability of 
flagged misinformative content. We conclude each section presenting the policy-
makers’ viewpoints on each challenge with a brief commentary. 
4.1 Challenges for policymakers on social media 
The first goal of this study was to explore the policymakers’ self-identified chal-
lenges in combating misinformation on social media. Policymakers identified sev-
eral challenges, including lack of resources to validate information and correct 
misinformation, and their own professional routines. Among the chief challenges 
mentioned by policymakers was the amount of information that needs to be evalu-
ated when formulating a decision. This makes validating the information both a 
time-consuming and a very complex process, and as a result, due to time con-
straints, there is often reliance on the expertise and knowledge of other peer deci-
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sion-makers. The impact that misinformation can have on decision-making is a 
concern to policymakers, especially considering that the results of any decisions 
that may stem from misleading or inaccurate data may not be immediately visible. 
When faced with misinformation, time is of essence, and the need for immediate 
corrections or refutations is further complicated by the complexity of performing 
thorough information validation procedures. 
Currently, the actions that policymakers can take online are limited, and post-spe-
cific reporting actions were either viewed as futile (i.e., having limited impact on 
the wider challenge of misinformation) or seen as potentially dangerous. Our 
study participants provided some examples on dilemmas they faced in their own 
line of work, where they feared that removals of what they perceived as extremist 
media posts could have a counter-effect and increase polarisation, as such censor-
ing actions may be perceived as limiting the public’s freedom of speech. Policy-
makers also expressed skepticism about the potential of technological solutions, 
stating that misinformation complexity requires critical reasoning by humans 
rather than automated solutions. 
4.2 Reconceptualising social media platforms to create a trusted 
network of experts and collaborators 
Policymakers indicated that internet platforms do not currently support the collec-
tion of information that would be useful to a policymaker nor do they facilitate ac-
cess to trusted networks and information online. Data from the focus group and 
the in-depth interviews clearly suggest that the study respondents already have 
existing networks of experts with whom they collaborate offline, and daily evalu-
ate claims relating to news stories or posts. Streamlining these procedures and 
sharing knowledge on news stories that have been fact-checked internally (within 
a policymaker’s organisation) or externally (by fact-checking organisations or jour-
nalists) appears to be a need that should be addressed. While still of use to policy-
makers, most of the policies already in place on social media target civil society; 
furthermore, there is still much that needs to be developed even for civil society to 
increase everyday users’ resilience to misinformation. We explain the major 
themes regarding the identified needs and challenges relating to policymakers’ 
use of the internet to monitor, control and reduce online misinformation. 
Our analysis revealed a need for functionalities (such as dashboards connected to 
social media platforms) that would enable policymakers liaise with experts (i.e., 
subject-matter experts) and external collaborators (i.e., journalists or fact-check-
ers). Policymakers involved in the co-creation workshops had disparate fields of 
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professional expertise and expressed an interest in having the ability to define 
topics that are aligned with their own professional interests and expertise when 
addressing potential misinformation found online to allow for a speedier and more 
streamlined response. 
The ability to quickly share internal decisions about misinformation correction 
with third parties such as legal counsels, was also raised as an important issue. 
Policymakers also commented on the importance of providing flagging functionali-
ties, to enable them to tag suspected misinformation posts or news stories to be 
reviewed by fact-checkers, or to report posts to administrators claiming a post as 
misinformation based on their own professional expertise. 
Integration with existing social media platforms would enhance the usability of 
any such tool. A tool that would enable and facilitate access to journalists was also 
considered important, with many policymakers emphasising the necessity of inter-
disciplinary synergies to harness collective expertise. Policymakers clearly ex-
pressed that there is limited access to journalists and pointed to the need to 
bridge this gap to allow for greater collaboration either by allowing tagging posts 
for review and assigning external evaluators, or by connecting them to other rele-
vant parties (other policymakers, media officials, journalists, fact-checkers). En-
abling policymakers to connect with fact-checkers, other experts, and other stake-
holders to request or receive information relating to tagged news stories or posts, 
is an important design recommendation that emerged from our analyses. Further 
to this, facilitating this connection provides the opportunity of direct access to 
publishers and journalists and thus enables a speedier notification of publishers 
and journalists regarding corrected information. In addition, policymakers men-
tioned that there is a communication problem within institutional hierarchies, of-
ten due to limited access to others; therefore, a collaboration platform could also 
facilitate intra-organisational collaboration in terms of information sharing, or 
sharing of expertise, especially in larger, more complex institutions. As shown in 
the following excerpt, ideally, an online platform would facilitate communication 
across stakeholders and could also facilitate the fast dissemination of corrected in-
formation. 
For governmental institutions, the means through which serious news that may 
have a negative result is addressed, is through a press release, which has to be 
released and disseminated fast and it is through this that all relevant publishers 
and institutions should be informed. The way that this press release is 
managed, doesn’t have to be in the traditional way, like most press releases, but 
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it could take place through some kind of software, that can provide an 
immediate update. (Greece, Policymaker, in-depth interview, Co-creation 
Workshop 1) 
Our analyses indicated that policymakers have an existing offline network of reli-
able and trustworthy experts or collaborators, and that providing policymakers 
with a tool that allows them to create a central database, which they can use to 
gain immediate feedback on the evaluation or correction status of misinforming 
content would be of particular benefit to them. This need to take additional ac-
tions online is illustrated in the following excerpt from an Austrian policymaker: 
“What is disseminated in the media, is useless. I would like to add to the authors. If 
necessary, inform and encourage people who know better to do something. Forward to 
multiplicators. Or to experts.” (Austria, Policymaker, in-depth interview, Co-Creation 
Workshop 1) 
The potential for expediting the correction procedure, by centrally assigning and 
receiving feedback on disputed information was clearly presented as an appealing, 
if not required, response to the challenge of misinformation, especially provided 
that time is of the essence in issuing corrections online (Walter & Tukachinsky, 
2020). The following excerpt illustrates the wishlist of a Greek policymaker consid-
ering how to correct misinformation regarding the monetary allowances that im-
migrants receive in Greece (a recurrent theme of heated discussions on social me-
dia). 
I would like to have a button, not a ‘divine’ button that tells the truth, more like 
a procedure. I mean, a button sounds a little Orwellian, having a supreme force 
tell me if it’s all truth or all lies. But, have a fact-checker, to tell, if nothing else, 
if in the country there are 18 million illegal immigrants and if they get an 
allowance or not. These two pieces of information can be checked. (Greece, 
Policymaker, in-depth interview, Co-Creation Workshop 1) 
Commentary 
Drawing from their experiences of facing the impact of misinformation, especially 
those relating to immigrants in Greece and Austria, the policymakers fall back to 
their everyday offline routines, which they would like to see extended online as 
they decide how to address misinformative comments. Their approach is, at least 
at the surface level, aligned with the criteria suggested by Vraga and Bode (2020), 
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and acknowledges that, on many occasions, they need to check in with experts, 
such as scientists or fact-checkers, in order to ascertain if something is indeed mis-
information. Even though they do not discuss the dynamic and contextualised na-
ture of misinformation, the need to triangulate their assessments, and reach evi-
dence-based decisions is an important element of policy-making (Décieux, 2020). 
Future studies could examine how policymakers reason with evidence with the 
help of such trusted sources and provide more insight into technologically-mediat-
ed policy-making versus the respective conventional practices. 
4.3 Facilitating the validation of online information in real-time 
Policymakers recognised that doctored information might be difficult to discern 
with human inspection alone and as a result expressed self-doubt about the evalu-
ation of online information. Policymakers' proposed ideal solutions, and their re-
sponses in relation to the limitations to online actions they adopt when address-
ing misinformative content, led to a set of design recommendations that may in-
form platform policies for timely information validation. They suggested that on-
line platforms can support this aspect of their work by providing tools to facilitate 
the policymakers’ evaluation of online information. Some of these tools may help 
them automatically detect misinformation, while other functionality might help 
them report misinformative content or ask for expert help in reviewing it. Time 
pressure, and the fast news cycle pace, were flagged as important; delayed re-
sponse to misinformation may have dire consequences for critical issues, such as 
violent actions and reactions to them. An example of the latter is, for instance, 
misinformation surfacing on Twitter and Facebook in late May/early June 2020, 
claiming that the police officer, charged with the death of George Floyd in the 
United States, was an actor and that the “incident had been faked by the deep 
state” (Alba, 2020); the spread of such misinformation can incite more violence 
against an already troubled state and its officers. 
Policymakers could contribute to the validation of online information in multiple 
ways: for instance, they could use their own professional expertise to rate the 
trustworthiness of images or news story content, assess a news story’s risk for 
spreading misinformation (for instance, high, medium or low risk), or add notes 
and context relating to identified misinformation. Designing for crowdsourcing the 
validation of news shared online, and allowing policymakers to categorise news 
organisations according to their level of trustworthiness based on their experi-
ences, emerged as a design recommendation amongst participants. The following 
excerpt presents such a proposal by a policymaker in Greece: 
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I’m thinking now of some lists, like, for instance, white, grey and blacklists, 
which evaluate technological solutions’ interoperability and electronic 
transaction services. It wouldn’t be so bad if we had similar lists for some sites 
that provided information, that could inform the [potential] software or inform 
us. (Greece, Policymaker, in-depth interview, Co-Creation Workshop 1) 
Displaying a social media post’s reliability based on a set of specific criteria was a 
design recommendation that emerged across all three co-creation sites and in all 
focus groups. Differentiating amongst users’ reliability online was also mentioned, 
with suggestions for differentiating posts shared by decision-makers, especially for 
posts that comment on misinformation and aim to raise awareness against misin-
forming content. 
Providing the necessary support that reinforces the reliability and trustworthiness 
of sources was raised as a very important issue. It was also underlined that correc-
tions provided by “verified” users should provide links to an explanation, or pro-
vide links to official responses, especially when a misinformation post is shared. 
Further to this, policymakers expressed more trust in established news organisa-
tions, and it was recommended that links either to related stories, or other news 
organisations’ story on the same topic, as well as other official sources, should also 
be connected to potentially misinforming posts to enable information validation. 
The process of validation would further be facilitated by providing information on 
the number of verified news organisations that have shared the same information. 
Participants noted that the identity of a news organisation reporting a story is im-
portant, but so is the journalist–therefore, it is necessary to provide sufficient in-
formation on the news institution’s background, as well as on the journalist’s pro-
fessional experience and reputation to determine whether a piece of information 
can be trusted. This idea that the reporting of reputation should go beyond the of-
ficial news source is evident in the following excerpt: 
So, if he’s an opinion leader or a journalist, who is himself spreading, in your 
own estimate, false news -- when I say false news, I mean in the sense of 
propaganda, false evidence, for instance wrong numerical figures – then he is 
deconstructing himself. That is to say, if he’s someone important, a journalist or 
a politician for instance, and he starts reproducing completely fake news, then 
at some point his own credibility falls, because it becomes something known. 
(Greece, Policymaker, in-depth interview, Co-Creation Workshop 1) 
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Even though policymakers indicated an awareness of existing tools and fact-
checking resources, providing a repository of existing tools on social media plat-
forms emerged as an important recommendation as none of the existing platforms 
or software plugins have all of the functionality they need. Participants also dis-
cussed the possibility of automating the rating of the veracity of the news auto-
matically, as they mentioned that when assessing information online they also pay 
importance to the source itself, and specifically the source URL. They suggested 
that automation processes would be helpful in quickly sifting through information 
quality on social media, such as scanning the daily news reports to provide a sum-
mary, and potentially serve as a daily baseline. Since misinformation also includes 
pairing out-of-context images and news content or headlines, automating checks 
that evaluate image-news congruity was another design recommendation that 
stemmed from the policymakers’ discussions. Finally, the proliferation of online 
bots and trolls was connected to this need and the ability to tag specific social me-
dia accounts as trolls, based on online behaviour. This would contribute to identi-
fying and avoiding such accounts; removing or blocking bot or troll accounts on 
social media was also emphasised. 
Commentary 
While policy-making includes slower paced decision-making, it also often includes 
the need for quicker decision-making to respond to smaller or larger crises. In a 
large crisis situation, in particular, it is important to respond quickly and accurate-
ly, hence the participants’ recommendations for automating some of the verifica-
tion processes to validate sources, filtering out unwanted information and reduc-
ing information overload. The policymakers did not substantially discuss the feasi-
bility of such operations nor did they bring up the ethical aspects of the suggested 
automated processes. Given the definition of misinformation as a fluid, changing 
and dynamic body of knowledge, as described in Vraga and Bode (2020), and the 
risks that are inherent with censoring information, as a project we adopt the idea 
that computational tools can support quicker responses to addressing potentially 
misinformative content, but should not replace people’s critical examination of the 
data. A current debate in the literature is whether free speech is increasingly being 
used as a shield to allow hate speech (Titley, 2020). Therefore, the design of such 
technical efforts should be done in a transparent and retraceable manner. Finally, 
we also believe that it is important for future work to address policymakers’ men-
tal models and operationalisation of misinformation, as well as provide case stud-
ies of how policymakers react to misinformation in real time. 
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4.4 Providing access to visualisations of data at different levels of 
granularity 
Presently, internet platforms do not offer the functionality of different viewpoints 
into users’ online activity. While big data are being amassed, they are mostly used 
for commercial, profit-making purposes. Policymakers in this study indicated that 
access to the information source trail, that is, mapping the information path and its 
spread on social media and providing ratings of user behaviours, as they relate to 
misinformation-sharing trends, would be useful. In addition, having the access to 
data that relates to the number of fact-checks or official refutations a post has 
amassed, would further enhance the post’s credibility. Policymakers emphasised 
the importance of having accurate data in order to make decisions and mentioned 
that being able to view customised data at bird’s eye view in regard to misinforma-
tion, i.e., within their country, would be particularly useful in assessing misinfor-
mation impact at a local level. For example, a Swedish policymaker asked for the 
following: 
“There should be a statistic on how often fake news is spreading over, at least, Scandi-
navia, or Sweden if you have it, but feels like it’s not that much.” (Sweden, Policymak-
er, in-depth interview, Co-Creation Workshop 1) 
Policymakers wished that social media platforms could provide access to official 
information, such as statistics, as it is easy for someone to misrepresent data. Even 
though data are available from official data sources, i.e. from national institutions, 
or at a European level from organisations such as Eurostat, including links to such 
official data sources, which are considered trustworthy by policymakers, would 
support evidence-based policy-making and enhance the trustworthiness of the in-
formation. 
Commentary 
The policymakers in our study point to the usefulness of trusted sources of infor-
mation and the power that easily accessible and dynamic representations could al-
so provide to their decision-making. The issue of trustworthiness of the source of 
information or of the source of assessing the information has been a recurring 
theme in our conversations with policymakers and it is one that should be attend-
ed to when designing technological solutions for policymakers. 
4.5 Increasing transparency and explainability of flagged 
misinformative content 
Policymakers in our study frequently pointed out that citizens should also be part 
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of the effort to identify and curtail misinformation, and suggested a number of ap-
proaches and software features that could enhance misinformation resilience for 
everyday users. For instance, when misinformation is corrected, a post on social 
media that contains a link to a news story with false information should also in-
clude information on fact-checked data and provide access to officially corrected 
information. 
The algorithmic regulation of online information can lead to technology operating 
as a non-human policymaker (Lessig, 1999; Just & Latzer, 2017), through filtering 
or blocking information from groups of users, who may often be unaware of such 
practices. Policymakers seem to frown upon such practices, as they perceive trans-
parency as a facilitator of modern democracies (Hale, 2008). It is often reported 
that the public should have sufficient information to understand how algorithms 
manage media content (Picard & Pickard, 2017). At the moment, internet plat-
forms do not provide sufficient information for citizens or policymakers to help 
them understand such manipulations. Some strategies seem to be more effective 
in correcting misperceptions, such as providing an explanation rather than a sim-
ple refute, exposing users to related but disconfirming stories, and revealing the 
demographic similarity of the opposing group (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015). 
The importance of communicating the automation rules and maintaining trans-
parency in how a technology that addresses misinformation may be automating 
certain procedures, remained a key concern for participants; this has also been dis-
cussed in the literature (see Butler, Joyce, & Pike, 2008). Providing access and facil-
itating communication procedures emerged as key desired components of any fu-
ture technological solutions. Specifically, the policymakers indicated a need for 
tools to be open access and to provide clearly transparent procedures for their 
functionalities. This design recommendation was highlighted in the comment by a 
Swedish policymaker, as shown below: 
“A lot of these methods, they aren’t open access so you cannot see how they are oper-
ating and if these methods of fact-checking are actually accurate. So, it’s also very hard 
to tell you can’t judge the whole truth from these kinds of sites either because of that.” 
(Sweden, Policymaker, in-depth interview, Co-Creation Workshop 1) 
At the same time, several policymakers across sites suggested a need for a more 
media-literate citizenry, which can question and engage in critical reflection about 
the information it is receiving on social media. 
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Commentary 
Transparency and explainability are rising in importance as artificial intelligence, 
algorithms and recommender systems are increasingly being used to personalise 
the online experience and to promote commercial and other interests. According 
to Llansó, van Hoboken, Leerssen, and Harambam (2020) policymakers’ possible in-
terventions to recommender systems’ actions include “content removal and other 
forms of moderation, algorithmic content curation, user customization options, 
transparency, and media literacy” (p. 18). The policymakers’ suggestions were 
aligned with these recommendations and showed awareness of the issues. At the 
same time, the policymakers’ responses indicated an awareness of the problematic 
aspects when it comes to implementing these technologies. They appear to under-
stand that the use of powerful technologies also requires technology platforms to 
be accountable by becoming more transparent in how they work, and a media lit-
erate populace. These discussions indicate the complexity of the issue and reiter-
ate the importance of synergies across time, scale and societal actors. The data we 
collected have, nonetheless, remained at a more general level; it is important that 
future work delves deeper into what constitutes acceptable and satisfactory levels 
of explainability and transparency on social media and for whom. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper discussed how policymakers view their role in combating the spread of 
misinformation on social media, and their self-identified challenges and proposed 
possible solutions to address them. Key findings included the need for access to 
trusted networks online, for technological resources to quickly identify and ad-
dress misinformation, making different levels of data representations available to 
support evidence-based decisions, and for increased transparency and explainabil-
ity of misinformation-targeting actions online. 
Policy networks and knowledge brokers have always been important in policy-
making (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Gathering and activating resources, including 
social and human capital, is key to successful policy networks. Although there is 
considerable work in successfully managing a network that can guide effective 
policy-making, our study participants indicate that there is a need for re-imagining 
social media platforms’ facilitation of policy-making to address online misinforma-
tion. Renegotiating policy-making spaces refers to providing policymakers with 
new tools and providing them with new ways to access policy networks online (as 
compared to more traditional, slower methods for such access). These new spaces 
and modes of collaboration should be dynamic, re-configurable and accessible on-
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demand. 
The practical implications of policymakers’ self-identified needs may be interpret-
ed as requests for social media platforms that cater to specific decision-making 
needs. Requests such as facilitating collaboration with experts and journalists, pro-
viding the opportunity to solicit fact-checks and report problem cases (such as the 
possibility of trolls, blatant misinformation, etc.), as well as allowing for personali-
sation and customisation across different socio-cultural contexts, were reported by 
policymakers as deviating from social media’s current scope. Such changes would 
require dashboards that allow intra-organisational collaboration, as well as enable 
inter-organisational synergies among journalists, fact-checkers, and other external 
collaborators within policymakers’ trusted networks. Are internet platforms inter-
ested and capable of instigating these kinds of changes? Do they see governmen-
tality (Foucault, 1991), that is societal action that is de-centralised and can also be 
enacted by citizens, as part of their mission and values? Or are these develop-
ments part of the struggle between platforms and others as in terms of power and 
control? 
Platform policies can be fully automated, such as evaluating the credibility of the 
content by using misinformation detection algorithms, or can be semi-automated 
when fully automated policies cannot be applied and human intervention is re-
quired for a policy to be supported by automation. Examples of the latter include 
reporting misinforming content that was not clearly identified by automatic algo-
rithms or reporting content that was mistakenly identified as misinformation. Such 
policies are semi-automated since they need manual intervention from users to 
provide evidence, such as a URL or other feedback for the post that may have been 
inaccurately flagged or labeled. In ongoing work, we are developing and investi-
gating a software plugin that implements such policies. We are also developing a 
social media dashboard prototype for policymakers to examine how such software 
can address some of the challenges on evidence-based approaches to decision-
making and combating misinformation on social media. In addition to socio-tech-
nical solutions that can address some of the gaps of knowledge in contemporary 
policy-making, more research is needed that can illustrate the impact of such 
tools, and present case studies and data on the potential of the contribution of cit-
izen participation in policy-making. 
We ultimately argue that this reconceptualisation of social media platforms is a 
necessary adaptation in the current complex online information environment; the 
speed and quantity of information on social media make it difficult to monitor, flag 
and curb misinformative content, and policymakers have little by way of combat-
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ing misinformation online. Indeed, this can sometimes even lead to the inadver-
tent spread of misinformation by key policy actors themselves, especially in infor-
mation-rich and diverse situations (Brennen et al., 2020). While recommendations 
for revised platform policies may still appear as a wish list, the prominence of so-
cial media in the information and news ecosystem necessitates that these are tak-
en under serious consideration. 
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